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After what surely was a life-changing experience, many 
FIDS personnel simply returned to their previous lives. The 
recruiters used to stress that FIDS was not a career oppor-
tunity. However, it changed the lives of some for ever. The 
late R.M. (Fritz) Koerner, who was recruited by FIDS the 
same year as Bod Shaw but worked on a different base, 
went back to university and then served on AINA’s Devon 
Island Expedition and the British Trans-Arctic Expedi-
tion before becoming Canada’s leading glaciologist. Bod 
Shaw became the Senior Meteorological Observer at the 
McGill Sub Arctic Research Laboratory in Schefferville, 
Québec-Labrador. He was one of a number of FIDS peo-
ple who worked at the Laboratory over the years, training 
Canadian students, many of whom went on to conduct polar 
work of their own. His sea ice experience helped make him 
a pioneer of the Lab’s productive lake ice research program. 
After the Lab, Bod Shaw taught at a rural school in Britain 
where weather observing and snow observations were an 
important part of the curriculum.
This attractive book will please a wide age range of read-
ers, both those with polar experience and those whose polar 
experience is through reading.
Peter Adams
Professor Emeritus
Department of Geography
Trent University
Peterborough, Ontario K9J 7B8, Canada
peter.adams@cogeco.ca
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After the return of the Canadian Arctic Expedition of 
1913 – 18, the Canadian government initially planned 
to publish the expedition’s scientific results in 10 (later 
increased to 17) volumes, which would include a total of 78 
individual reports. What ultimately appeared were 13 vol-
umes comprising 64 individual reports. Strikingly absent 
from the final total is Volume I, which was to have con-
tained Part A, Narrative of the Northern Party 1913 – 1918, 
by the overall expedition leader Vilhjalmur Stefansson, 
and Part B, Narrative of the Southern Party, 1913 – 1916, 
by Rudolph M. Anderson. In terms of the Northern Par-
ty’s activities, this striking absence of the official general 
accounts of the expedition is explained by author Stuart 
Jenness (son of the expedition’s anthropologist, Diamond 
Jenness) as follows: “Unfortunately Stefansson was busy 
enriching his reputation and his pocket at the time by pub-
lishing and lecturing across the U.S. and Canada about the 
‘friendly’ Arctic” (p. 312). The absence of an account of 
the Southern Party’s activities was due to the fact that its 
leader, Dr. Rudolph Anderson, was too busy with his duties 
as general secretary of the editorial committees for the 
series and (from 1920) as the chief of the Biology Division 
of the Geological Survey of Canada.
Stefansson’s book, The Friendly Arctic (1921), being 
a popular account, scarcely filled this lacuna, especially 
since Anderson and W.L. McKinlay (the expedition’s mete-
orologist) found “many errors of fact in Stefansson’s book 
and disagreed violently one hundred percent with both the 
book’s title and its central theme…” (p. 312). But now, for 
the first time, Stuart Jenness has effectively filled this con-
spicuous gap in the expedition’s series of reports. His book 
presents in considerable, interesting detail not only the 
complex and intricate activities of both parties, but also the 
story of the loss of the expedition ship, Karluk, with subse-
quent substantial loss of life, and the details of the bitter and 
protracted feud between the two leaders of the expedition, 
Vilhjalmur Stefansson and Rudolph Anderson.
Stefansson originally conceived the expedition as a small 
endeavour aimed at possibly discovering new land to the 
north and northwest of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
and at locating the boundary of the continental shelf. He 
initially obtained a promise of financial support from the 
National Geographic Society, with a promise of matching 
funding from the American Museum of National History. 
Stefansson then approached the Canadian Prime Minister, 
Robert Borden, who undertook to underwrite the entire 
expedition if Stefansson became a Canadian (i.e., British) 
citizen, and if a cadre of scientists reporting to the Geologi-
cal Survey of Canada were added to the expedition. This is 
the origin of the two parties: the Northern Party to pursue 
Stefansson’s initial aims, and the Southern Party to map the 
Arctic coast from Cape Parry east to Kent Peninsula and 
make a wide range of scientific observations and collec-
tions. The Northern Party was to report to the Department 
of the Naval Service, and the Southern Party to the Geo-
logical Survey of Canada.
Under the command of Captain Bob Bartlett, the expe-
dition’s main vessel, Karluk, sailed from Victoria, Brit-
ish Columbia, on 17 June 1913. After calling at Nome and 
Teller, Alaska, she headed north through Bering Strait and 
round Point Barrow but became beset in the ice and drifted, 
first east then west, only a relatively short distance offshore. 
On 19 September Stefansson headed ashore by dog sled to 
hunt caribou, accompanied by ethnographer Jenness, pho-
tographer Hubert Wilkins, his secretary Burt McConnell, 
and two Iñupiat.
Thereafter the ice drift carried Karluk west and north-
west, until she was ultimately crushed north of Her-
ald Island (Ostrov Geral’da). Before she sank, a relatively 
comfortable camp was established on the ice, from which 
Bob Bartlett organized the retreat south to Wrangel Island 
(Ostrov Vrangelya). Unfortunately, seven men did not even 
reach the relative safety of Wrangel Island. From there, Bar-
tlett and an Inuk succeeded in crossing Long Strait to the 
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Siberian mainland and ultimately reached St. Michael and 
Nome, where through Bartlett’s efforts, a rescue operation 
was mounted. The survivors on Wrangel Island were saved, 
although unfortunately there had been two further deaths 
on the island in the interim.
In the meantime the expedition’s other two vessels, 
Alaska and Mary Sachs, with the Southern Party under 
Rudolph Anderson onboard, had become beset off Collin-
son Point, near Camden Bay on Alaska’s North Slope, and 
the party was forced to winter there. On reaching Collinson 
Point, Stefansson tried to insist that Anderson provide him 
with one of the vessels, provisions, and equipment, so he 
could continue his search for new land in the Arctic Ocean 
despite the loss of Karluk. This demand greatly exacerbated 
the already strained relations between the two men and 
alienated all the scientists of the Southern Party. With what 
he had managed to requisition from the Southern Party, 
additional provisions that he obtained on the North Slope, 
a vessel (North Star) that he bought, and two men whom he 
recruited (Storker Storkerson and Ole Andreasen), Stefans-
son was able to proceed with his original plans.
On 22 March 1914, accompanied by Storkerson and 
Andreasen, Stefansson set off north from Martin Point on 
the North Slope with one sled, six dogs, food for a month, 
two rifles, and 160 rounds of ammunition. Sounding the 
depth on 22 April, they were unable to find bottom with 
4500 feet of wire, which indicated that they were beyond 
the edge of the continental shelf. Swinging east, the party 
reached Norway Island, off the west coast of Banks Island, 
on 25 June. Stefansson had thereby proved his hypotheses 
that one could survive by hunting anywhere in the Arc-
tic, and that there was no land in the section of the Arctic 
Ocean that they had traversed.
Over the three following seasons, building on the 
efforts of a complex system of support parties, Stefansson 
mounted two more forays out across the ice of the Arctic 
Ocean, but starting from points farther north. In the spring 
of 1915, he was again able to locate the edge of the conti-
nental shelf, but in 1917 he was forced to turn back when 
the two men accompanying him became ill with scurvy. 
His other achievement during those field seasons was to 
discover and explore some of the last islands to be discov-
ered in the Canadian Arctic, namely Brock Island, Borden 
Island (later found to be two islands, Borden and Macken-
zie King), Lougheed Island, and Meighen Island.
Stefansson mounted the last of these journeys in 1917, 
despite having received direct orders from the Department 
of Naval Service to terminate his expedition in 1916. He was 
even planning a further operation in the summer of 1918, 
namely a foray north from Prudhoe Bay in order to establish 
a drifting station that he hoped would result in a trans-Arctic 
drift. This plan was foiled, however, when he became seri-
ously ill with typhoid, which developed into pneumonia and 
pleurisy and forced him to go south. Thus ended Stefans-
son’s involvement in the Canadian Arctic Expedition. 
Meanwhile the Southern Party under Dr. Anderson was 
doing its best to fulfill its mandate despite uncooperative 
ice conditions and Stefansson’s interference. That mandate 
was “to map the geology and geography of a hundred-mile-
wide band of coast between Cape Parry and Bathurst Inlet” 
(p. 219), as well as to pursue archeological and anthropo-
logical studies of the Copper Inuit, plus biological studies 
of mammals, birds, plants, insects, and marine life. In 1913, 
completion of this ambitious programme was thrown into 
jeopardy when the party’s vessels became beset at Collin-
son Point, and one might have thought that their first win-
ter would be wasted since they were so far from their field 
area. But in the spring of 1914, O’Neill and Cox completed 
geological and topographic surveys of the Firth River and 
Diamond Jenness spent two months excavating a Thule site 
at Barter Island, while over the winter and spring Anderson 
made extensive collections of birds and mammals at Col-
linson Point, which were also relevant to the planned field 
area. And in June, Chipman, Cox, and O’Neill carried out 
detailed surveys of the major channels of the Mackenzie 
Delta.
In August 1914, the Southern Party under Anderson 
finally reached its field area onboard Alaska and Mary Sachs 
and established its base at Bernard Harbour. Over the fol-
lowing two years, the scientists of the Southern Party com-
pleted detailed geological and topographic surveys of 
the coast west to Darnley Bay and east to and including 
Bathurst Inlet. Meanwhile, Diamond Jenness completed 
extensive ethnographic studies in the Bernard Harbour area, 
southwestern Victoria Island, Coronation Gulf, and Bathurst 
Inlet. On 13 July 1916, the entire party left Bernard Har-
bour onboard Alaska, bound for Herschel Island, Nome, and 
finally Seattle, which they reached on 11 September 1916.
This account represents the barest outline of the activi-
ties of the Canadian Arctic Expedition. In his book, how-
ever, Jenness has detailed exhaustively all the complicated 
logistics not only of Stefansson’s own travels, but also the 
intricacies of his support parties’ movements, as well as 
those of the different components of the Southern Party. In 
general he is extremely critical of Stefansson, stating, for 
example, that “for Stefansson, public image was of vital 
importance, for he made his living by public lectures, writ-
ing and getting newspaper publicity. But for the dedicated 
scientist [Diamond] Jenness, Stefansson’s actions amounted 
to intolerable and unscientific interference” (p. 318 – 319). 
He is also very critical of Stefansson’s repeated changes 
of plan, usually without consultation, which resulted in 
a great deal of wasted time and effort for his various sup-
port parties. Furthermore he was very critical of “Stefans-
son’s uncontrolled mishandling of government funds” and 
of “the many extravagant cheques that Stefansson distrib-
uted around the Arctic in rebuilding and operating his new 
Northern Party” (p. 323) after the loss of Karluk. The origi-
nal estimate for the cost of the expedition had been $50 000; 
the final figure was $559 972, plus the scientists’ salaries. 
Such expenditure during wartime was seen as being par-
ticularly excessive.
At the same time, Jenness does recognize Stefansson’s 
considerable achievements: “Stefansson had pulled off 
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an incredible feat when he revised his original plans after 
the disappearance of the Karluk, trekked hundred of miles 
along the north coast of Alaska from Barrow to the Mac-
kenzie River, and emerged with a schooner, new supplies, 
and all the manpower he needed to carry out his exploration 
programme—all within a few short months” (p. 114). And 
again: “The Canadian Arctic Expedition 1913 – 1918, in spite 
of its tragic losses of life and shocking over-expenditures, 
was the most successful northern accomplishment in the 
early years of the twentieth century… [Stefansson’s] Expe-
dition was the vision of a remarkable Arctic explorer…” 
(p. 336).
Jenness cannot be faulted for his thorough and accurate 
use of archival sources, but he appears to be less familiar 
with the published literature. Thus, in discussing Stefans-
son’s citizenship (p. 16), he correctly reports that on 3 May 
1913 Stefansson took the oath of allegiance to King George 
V, implying that he thereby became a naturalized Canadian 
citizen (although born in Canada, he had lost his Canadian 
citizenship when his father became a naturalized Ameri-
can while Stefansson was still a child). But as Cavell and 
Noakes (2009:239) have pointed out, Stefansson did not 
complete two other requirements for becoming a Cana-
dian citizen; thus, since his swearing the oath of allegiance 
meant that he had lost his American citizenship, he had not 
officially become a Canadian, and in fact was stateless from 
1913 until 1937. 
On p. 75 – 76 Jenness reports that the Russian icebreaker 
Vaygach had been within 10 miles of Wrangel Island on 4 
August, when her captain heard a radio report of the start of 
World War I and was ordered back south to Anadyr, which 
implies that the Russians left the Karluk survivors in the 
lurch. In fact, on 4 August Vaygach was at Cape Dezhnev, 
in the narrows of Bering Strait, while her sister ship Tay-
myr was visiting Nome specifically to get further details of 
the situation at Wrangel Island. On learning of the start of 
the war, Taymyr proceeded to Anadyr, where she contacted 
St. Petersburg; the two icebreakers were ordered “to pro-
ceed with our mission” (Starokadomskiy, 1976:188). Mean-
while Vaygach had been trying to reach Wrangel Island but 
had become solidly beset in Long Strait within sight of the 
island on 12 August. In the battle with the ice she lost one 
blade from her propeller and at one stage was immobilized 
by an ice tongue jammed in the propeller. After coaling 
from a collier at Kolyuchinskaya Guba, both icebreakers 
made several further attempts to reach Wrangel Island, but 
were defeated by the ice on each occasion.
On p. 44, Jenness reports the “loss of all hands” from 
G.W. De Long’s ship, USS Jeannette, after their ship was 
crushed by the ice north of the New Siberian Islands [Novo-
sibirskie Ostrova] in 1881. In fact, of the 33 members of her 
crew, 21 of them reached the Siberian mainland, although 
only 12 ultimately survived (De Long, 1884).
But all these errors in Jenness’s text pertain to topics 
that are really peripheral to the main theme of the book, 
and they do not significantly detract from it. Jenness is to 
be congratulated on having produced the first complete 
account of all the intricacies of the Canadian Arctic Expe-
dition 1913 – 18.
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September 2012 saw the least sea ice ever recorded in the 
Arctic basin. Not only was the Northwest Passage open 
across the top of North America, but a Northeast Passage 
lay open across the top of Siberia as well. Earlier, satellite 
observations had shown that the entire surface of the inland 
ice in Greenland had unmistakable signs of thaw and that 
an ice floe twice the size of Manhattan had detached from 
Petermann Glacier in northwest Greenland. It is clear that 
the Arctic is warming rapidly. Although there are still many 
details to be filled in, all signs point to greater accessibil-
ity and more benign working conditions across much of the 
Arctic.
The History of Technology in Greenland provides a 
timely, nearly encyclopedic account of the development of 
Greenland’s technological infrastructure beginning in the 
18th century, through World War II and ending in the first 
decade of the 21st century. During this time Greenland was 
transformed from a hunting society into a modern indus-
trial society that differs little from that of mainland Europe.
The investment that made this transformation possible 
was largely provided by Denmark in the form of subsidies 
that supported the nascent Greenland government as it built 
the infrastructure that a modern society depends upon. 
